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Enacting National Environmental Laws
More Stringent than Other States'
Laws in the European
Community: Re Disposable Beer
Cans: Commission v. Denmark

Introduction
The European Community ("Community") incorporates twelve nations
("Member States") to achieve predominantly economic objectives.'
Although the principal task of the Community is to create a Common
Market through the complete integration of Member State economies,
the Community is increasingly announcing policies designed to protect
the environment. These environmental policies, however, have been
limited by the Community's primary goal-achieving a Common
Market.
Environmental measures, introduced at either the Community or
the Member State level, can conflict with economic integration, a primary policy of the Treaty of Rome, which established the European Economic Community. When the Community initiates environmental
policies, it often must overcome the Member States' concern with the
1. The twelve Member States are: Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Greece, Spain, and Portu-

gal.

T. C. HARTLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 1-5 (2d ed. 1988).

Three separate communities comprise the Community: the European Coal and Steel
Community ("ECSC"), European Economic Community ("EEC"), and European
Atomic Energy Community ("Euratom"). The ECSC was established by a treaty
signed in Paris in 1951, while the EEC and the EURATOM were initiated by two
different treaties signed in Rome in 1957. D. LASOK &J. W. BRIDGE, LAW & INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 12-16 (4th ed. 1987). While in law three Com-

munities exist, as a result of a "Merger Treaty," only one set of institutions serves the
Community. D. LAsOK &J. W. BRIDGE, supra, at 18; see also T. C. HARTLEY, supra, at 4.

Although it is unknown when the Communities will be merged, it is clear that there
already exists a single institutional and political entity which the phrase the "European Community" aptly describes. This Note refers to the EEC as the prototype for
the European Community. See generally Lomas, Environmental Protection, Economic Conflict and the EC, 33 REVUE DE DRorr DE McGILL 506, 508 n.l (1988) (explaining Communities in Europe); E. REHBINDER & R. STEWART, 2 INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW:
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION POLICY §§ II et. seq. (1985). This Note's references to
the "Treaty" correspondingly refer to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar.

25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. II [hereinafter Treaty].
24 CORNELL INT'L LJ.563 (1991)
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costs of implementing environmental programs. Likewise, when a Member State enacts environmental measures stricter than those of other
States, other Member States often claim that the environmentally motivated measures are protectionist and violate European Community law.
Thus, a Member State cannot unilaterally implement environmental
standards without Community implications.
When a Member State seeks unilaterally to enact stringent environmental standards, the Community generally responds in two ways. The
Community may enact a Community-wide directive effectively harmonizing all Member States' laws or, alternatively, the Court of Justice of
the European Communities2 (the "Court") may invalidate the stringent
national regulation as protectionist. Both responses, harmonizing legislation and judicially invalidating national measures, define the progress
of environmental protection policy in the Community. 3
Economic integration and environmental protection collided in the
recent case before the Court, Re Disposable Beer Cans: E.C. Commission v.
Denmark.4 Denmark had unilaterally enacted an environmental law that
required the re-use and recycling of certain bottles in an effort to reduce
waste. Foreign producers argued that the measure reduced their competitiveness in Denmark. Although the Court agreed, the Court permitted certain aspects of Denmark's recycling program. This decision
represents the first time the Court has allowed Member States to enact
environmental protection measures contrary to economic integration.
This Note examines the right of Member States to enact environmental measures more stringent than measures of other States and finds
that in Commission v. Denmark the Court gave Member States a basis for
enacting environmental laws contrary to economic integration. Section
I briefly explores the conflicting goals of economic integration and environmental protection in the Community. Section II examines the recent
Community case Re Disposable Beer Cans: Commission v. Denmark. Section
III considers the impact of Commission v. Denmark on Member States'
right to enact strict environmental laws. This Note concludes that Commission v. Denmark allows Member States to enact environmental laws
more stringent than those of other States so long as the national measures do not run contrary to the Community's Treaty prohibition on
trade restrictions.
2. The Court ofJustice of the European Communities holds the judicial power
of the Community and its most important function is to ensure that, in the interpretation and application of the Treaty, the law is enforced. T. C. HARTLEY, supra note 1,
at 49; D. LAsoK &J. W. BRIDGE, supra note 1, at 32-33.

3. Community decisions bind the Member States and derive their binding force
from the fact that they are made by organs endowed with the appropriate power by
the three original treaties. T. C. HARTLEY, supra note 1, at 7. The Community represents a new type of political organism which has been described as "supranational."
Id.
4.

1988 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 4607, 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 619 (1989).
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I. Background
Part A of this section first provides a brief overview of the European
Community and its goal of achieving a Common Market. Part B discusses the role of economic integration in creating Community environmental protection policy. Part C examines the Court's role in
promoting economic integration and its impact on Member States'
regulations.
A. The European Community and a Common Market
The European Community's predominant objectives are to create a single Common Market 5 and to project itself as a single trading entity in
the world market. 6 Conceptually, a Common Market can be described
as: "a market in which everybody is free to work, invest, produce, buy
and sell wherever in the Member States the conditions for his activities,
which may not be artificially distorted by subsidies or legislative or other
state or business practices, are most favorable." 7 The Community
expects to achieve a Common Market through the complete "economic
integration" of Member State economies. Among other things, unifying
States' economies requires that Member States agree to harmonize
laws 8 and to abolish trade barriers. 9
5. Article 2 of the Treaty sets out the objectives of the Community in its move
towards a Common Market:
It shall be the aim of the Community, by establishing a Common Market and
progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic
activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increased stability, an
accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between its
Member States.
Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 2.
6. D. LASOK & J.W. BRIDGE, supra note 1, at 385. Because the Community's
existence implies an interaction of politics and economies, the political integration of
the Member States will reflect the progress of economic integration. Id at 386. Community law aimed at economic integration thus acts to create not only a Common
Market but also to bind the Member States into an economic union. Id.
The Community hopes to achieve complete economic integration and the Common Market by 1992. Id. at 21. "Large Market" in Community parlance refers to the
ambitious plan announced in the Commission's 1985 "White Paper on the Completion of the Internal Market" to abolish barriers to the movement of persons, goods,
and services by 1992. Common Environmental Safety Standards Part of Plan to Unify Internal Market by 1992, 9 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 111-12 (1986).
7. 3 LAW OF THE EEC: A COMMENTARY ON THE EEC TREATY 475 (1985) [hereinafter LAw OF THE EEC].
8. Article 100 of the Treaty empowers the Council to issue directives to harmonize the laws of the Member States which directly affect the establishment and functioning of the Common Market. Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 100; see also LAW OF THE
EEC, supra note 7, at 473 (explaining the harmonization of statutes and administrative regulations).
Referring to the 1992 goal for creating the Common Market, the Commission said
that it foresees enacting uniform environmental and safety standards to be an important step in removing trade barriers among Member States. Common Environmental
Safety Standards Part of Plan to Unify Internal Market by 1992, supra note 6, at 111-12.
9. Legal Background on Sixth Amendment of EEC DirectiveMerits Study, Advisor Says, 9
INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 465-66 (1986). Unifying the market presupposes that Mem-
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In general, harmonization replaces diverse national rules with a uniform Community rule.' 0 Article 100 of the Treaty has been utilized to
harmonize Member States' laws and to eliminate trade barriers. " Article 100 directs the Community to enact legislation harmonizing Member
States' rules which directly affect the "establishment or functioning of
the Common Market."' 2 Harmonization thus transfers power from
Member States to the Community in the interest of furthering economic
3
integration. 1
Trade barriers between the Member States are to be removed by
implementing Community policies including the "four freedoms," a sys14
tem of free competition, and other common coordinated policies.
The "four freedoms" include the free movement of goods, services, persons, and capital.' 5 The four freedoms diminish the effectiveness of
national regulations that are stricter than those of other States. 16 For
example, price subsidies in one country would lead to such an increase
in exports and a decrease in imports that the controls would become
impractical.
Community law affords two means for achieving the four freedoms.
The Community may, by means of legislation, 17 require Member States
to harmonize laws which restrict trade. Alternatively, the Court may
judicially invalidate Member States' laws that contravene Treaty proviber States agree to abolish barriers of all kinds, to harmonize national laws, to
approximate legislation and tax structures, and to strengthen monetary cooperation.
Id. For a discussion of the mechanisms provided by the Treaty to establish these
goals, see Collins & Hutchings, Articles 101 and 102 of the EEC Treaty: Completing the
InternalMarket, I1 EUR. L.R. 191 (1986). See generally LAW OF THE EEC, supra note 7,
at 473-475 (stating the meaning of Common Market to interpret the general purposes of the Treaty).
10. See J. USHER, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND NATIONAL LAW 74-77 (1981);
Weatherill, The Free Movement of Goods, in Current Developments-European Community

Law, 38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 689, 692 (1989). For a discussion of the free movement
of goods in the Community as one of the "four freedoms" integral to achieving the
Common Market, see generally F. BURROWS, FREE MOVEMENT IN EUROPEAN COMMUNrrY LAW 3-113 (1987) (explaining the free movement of goods within the Common

Market).
11. Weatherill, supra note 10, at 692.
12. Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 100.
13. J. USHER, supra note 10, at 70-73.
14. L. GORMLEY, PROHIBITING RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE WITHIN THE EEC 177
(1985). See generally P. OLIVER, FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS IN THE EEC (1982) (examining Articles 30 to 36 of the Treaty of Rome regarding restrictions on imports and
exports among Member States).
15. The "four freedoms" characterize the proper operation of the Common Market. LAW Or THE EEC, supra note 7, at 477.

16. Id.
17. The Commission may propose to the Council draft directives aimed at harmonizing Member States' laws which restrict trade. Id. Once adopted, the directives
become binding on the Member States and enforceable by the Commission before
the Court ofJustice. See generally T. C. HARTLEY, supra note 1, at 283-290 (discussing
enforcement of Community law).
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sions prohibiting trade restrictions.' 8 Using these means, the Community fights States' legislated trade barriers that were ostensibly erected to
further legitimate national interests (e.g. health, safety, environment)
but which, in fact, are protectionist. 19
B.

Community Environmental Policy

Environmental protection has become an established consideration in
making Community policy, 20 even though it is not directly linked to the
development and functioning of the Common Market as an economic
institution. 2 ' Prior to enactment of the Single European Act 2 2 ("SEA")
in 1987, environmental protection was a policy of the Community, 2 3 but
was not specifically enumerated within the Treaty. 24 By means of the
18. The Commission has authority to bring Member States before the Court
directly to enforce provisions of the Treaty in order to prohibit trade restrictions. T.
C. HARTLEY, supra note 1, at 283-285, 290. Article 169 of the Treaty gives the Commission this authority when it "considers that a Member State has failed to fulfill any
of its obligations under [the] Treaty." Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 169; see also T. C.
HARTLEY, supra note 1, at 290 (explaining Article 169 of the Treaty); Collins & Hutchings, supra note 9, at 191-193.
19. Note, The Free Movement of Goods and Regulationfor Public Health and Consumer
Protection in the EEC: The West German "Beer Purity" Case, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 753, 754
(1988) (authored by Harry L. Clark) [hereinafter Note, West German "Beer Purity"
Case].
20. President of the Commission, Jacques Delors, stated in his February 1989
address to the European Parliament that,
The gradual process of attaining the central objective of a single European
market cannot be seen in isolation from the other five objectives which,
under the terms of the Single Act, are inextricably linked to revision of the
Treaty... (economic and social cohesion, social policy and environment) and
the policies made necessary by the success of the large market (research and
technological development, monetary capacity).
Remarks of PresidentDelors on the Commission's Programfor 1989, Bulletin of the European
Communities 12 (1989 & Supp. Feb. 1989) [hereinafter Remarks of President Delors].
21. At the time of the Treaty, environmental protection was not discerned to be a
problem and therefore did not become one of the Treaty's objectives. E. REHBINDER
& R. STEWART, supra note 1, at 18-19.
22. Single European Act, OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L. 169) 1 (1987) reprinted in 2
COMM. MKr. L. REv. 741 (1987).
23. The Court first recognized that Community law includes environmental policy in Commission v. Italian Republic in which it upheld a Directive aimed at environmental protection. Commission v. Italian Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1115,
1122, 1 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 331 (1981). The Court ruled that,
Furthermore it is by no means ruled out that provisions on the environment
may be based upon Article 100 of the Treaty. Provisions which are made
necessary by considerations relating to the environment and health may be a
burden upon the undertakings to which they apply and if there is no harmonization of national provisions on the matter, competition may be appreciably distorted.
Id.; see also Jans, Article 7 EEC and a Non-DiscriminatoryTransfrontierEnvironmental Policy,
1 L.R. EUROPA INsTrruuT, 21, 22 (1988) (stating that Community law covers environmental law given the practice of the Council and the case).
24. Until the SEA, the Community justified environmental policies by claiming
that environmental protection was a Community objective that comprehended the
economic aims. E. REHBINDER & R. STEWART, supra note 1, at 11. Legal writers generally felt that, "[t]he Community's expansion into this policy area is a considerable
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SEA, Member States amended the Treaty to include environmental
objectives and establish a clear legal basis for Community environmen25
tal policy for the first time.
1.

Environmental Policy Priorto the Single EuropeanAct

Prior to the Single European Act, environmental policy developed incidentally to the Community's removal of obstacles to trade between
Member States. 2 6 When a Member State enacted an environmental
standard that effectively restricted trade, the Community responded by
enacting directives to harmonize the national laws. 2 7 In so doing, the
Community created environmental policy.
The directives to control motor vehicle emissions illustrate the early
focus of Community environmental policy. 2 8 The Community initiated
the directives in response to West German and French efforts to eliminate health and environmental risks from vehicle emissions. 29 Because
the proposed West German and French regulations imposed measures
more stringent than other States, the Community enacted the directives
to prevent the erection of trade barriers in vehicles. 30 Enacted under
Article 100, the directives arose from a need to harmonize national laws
in order to preserve or improve the functioning of the Common
31
Market.
While many directives issued in response to national programs did
increase environmental protection, the Community's environmental
agenda became a patchwork of programs. When the Community
enacted environmental directives to prevent trade restrictions, those
Member States wanting strict environmental programs were able to set
the pace and direction of Community progress by unilaterally proposing
stringent national legislation. 3 2 Community environmental policy was a
extension of Community law and policy at the expense of Member States without any
express authority." Id. at 19.
25. Environmental Ministers Council Urged to Use Voting Majority to Push Efforts, 10
INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 263 (1987).
26. See Haagsma, The European Community's Environmental Policy: A Case Study in Federalism, 12 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 311, 349-350 (1989); see, e.g., Community initiatives
1964-1975 under Articles 30, 92, 93 and 95 of the Treaty to prevent excessive subsi-

dization of the incineration or regeneration of used oils; Directives of 1967 which
established a uniform system of classification, labeling and packaging for hazardous
substances; Directive 70/1571 regulating noise levels and exhaust systems of vehicles; and Directive 70/220 limiting vehicle emissions. These Directives resulted from
the Community's harmonization program. E. RENBINDER &R. STEWART, supra note 1,
at 16-17.
27. ld
28. For a discussion of these directives see Lomas, supra note 1, at 524-5. See
generally Disagreements Among Member Countries Still Stall Auto Proposals, Officials Say, 9
INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 176-177 (1986).
29. See E. REHBINDER & R. STEWART, supra note 1, at 16-17; see Lomas, supra note
1, at 524.

30. See id.
31. E. REHBINDER & R.
524-527.
32. See id.

STEWART,

supra note 1, at 17; see Lomas, supra note 1, at
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product of reactive responses rather than a comprehensive political
33
program.
2. Environmental Policy after the Single European Act
In 1987, the Treaty was amended by the SEA,3 4 which seeks to develop
economic unification and to eliminate all existing barriers to free trade
and to the movement of goods, people, services and capital by 1992.3 5
As for environmental protection, the SEA amended the Treaty in two
respects.3 6 First, the Treaty now contains a title concerned solely with
environmental protection. This new environmental title consists of Articles 130R, 130S and 130T. Article 130R 3 7 outlines environmental
objectives and principles; 130S3 8 provides procedures for implementing
the policy; and 130T39 purports to allow more stringent national measures, but has not yet been used.40 Second, under new Article 1OA,
which addresses the Common Market, the Treaty now articulates a general level of environmental protection to be achieved through the harmonization of national measures. 41 Article 100A allows Member States
to opt out of harmonized measures in order to pursue important envi42
ronmental policies.
The Treaty amendments do not clearly indicate whether environmental measures require unanimous or majority vote. The confusion
occurs because there is no clear criteria for determining whether a mea33. See id.
34. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
35. Note, The Environmental Policy of the Europe Economic Community to Control Transnational Pollution-Time to Make Critical Choices, 12 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 579,
590-591 (1990) (authored by Christina Ruth Meltzer) [hereinafter Note, Time to Make
Critical Choices).
36. Haagsma, supra note 26, at 334; see also Note, Time to Make CriticalChoices, supra
note 35, at 589-594 (stating SEA's impact on environmental policies).
37. Article 130R provides in pertinent part,
1. Action by the Community relating to the environment shall have the following objectives: (i) to preserve, protect and improve the quality of the environment; (ii) to contribute towards protecting human health; (iii) to ensure a
prudent and rational utilization of natural resources.
Single European Act, supra note 22, at 755.
38. Article 130S provides in pertinent part,
The Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and
after consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, shall decide what action is to be taken by the Community.
The Council shall, under the conditions laid down in the preceding subparagraph, define those matters on which decisions are to be taken by a qualified
majority.
Single European Act, supra note 22, at 755.
39. Article 130T provides in pertinent part,
The protective measures adopted in common pursuant to Article 130S shall
not prevent any member-State from maintaining or introducing more stringent
protective measures compatible with this Treaty.
Single European Act, supra note 22, at 755.
40. Haagsma, supra note 26, at 336-337.
41. See Single European Act, supra note 22, at 749.
42. Id.; see also Haagsma, supra note 26, at 351-52.
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sure comes under Article 100A and the Common Market or Article 130S
and the environment. 4 3 This is important because the Article under
which a measure falls determines the number of votes required to pass
44
it. Article 130S requires unanimity to pass environmental measures.
Article 100A,on the other hand, requires only a qualified majority of the
45
Prior
Council to pass measures concerning environmental protection.
to the SEA, all environmental measures had to be approved unanimously because they were brought under Article 100.46 Many environmentally minded States disfavored majority voting because they feared it
standards in the already sensitive area of
would lead to a lowering 4of
7
environmental protection.
The Single European Act and Member States' Ability to Enact National
Environmental Laws More Stringent Than the Community

3.

Although the Treaty puts environmental policy on firm legal footing in
the Community, economic integration continues to dominate the
Treaty. 48 First, Article 130T of the new environmental title provides
that, "[t]he protective measures adopted in common pursuant to Article
130S shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or introducing more stringent protective measures compatible with this Treaty." 4 9
National "protective measures" are allowed only if "compatible with this
Treaty." This provision has been interpreted to prohibit stricter
national measures if the objective of the Community measure was not
only environmental protection but also facilitating free trade.5 0 If trade
between the States is affected, the Community measure will likely serve a
dual objective of protecting the environment and promoting the free
movement of goods. Thus, in most cases, rendering stricter national
measures will be impossible.5 1
Second, while Article 1OA provides for Member States' "opting
out" of Community-wide standards, it is subject to limitations. Article
100A provides in pertinent part, that:
43. See Lomas, supra note 1, at 512-513.

44. The requirement of unanimity for environmental proposals reflects Member
States' concern that sensitivity toward environmental matters varies from one Member State to another. Remarks of PresidentDelors, supra note 20, at 13.

45. Qualified majority voting adjusts the voting power of each Member State to
its population, while at the same time safeguarding the interests of smaller countries.

T. C.

HARTLEY,

supra note 1, at 16-17. The effect is that support of at least seven

states is needed to adopt a proposal. Lomas, supra note 1, at 513 n.23.
46. See supra note 31.
47. Those states with a high level of protection feared they might be out-voted
into reducing their level of environmental protection. Haagsma, supra note 26, at

350.
48. The Council of the European Communities and the Representatives of the Governments of
ENV'T REP. (BNA) 682 (1987).
49. Supra note 38 and accompanying text.
50. Haagsma, supra note 26, at 348.

the Member States, Meeting Within the Council, 10 INrr'L
51. Id.
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If, after the adoption of a harmonization measure by the Council acting
by a qualified majority, a Member State deems it necessary to apply
national provisions on grounds of major needs referred to in Article 36 or
relating to protection of the environment.., it shall notify the Commission of these provisions.
The Commission shall confirm the provisions involved after having
verified that they are not means of arbitrary discrimination
or a disguised
52
restriction on trade between Member States.
This "opting-out" provision subjects the right of Member States to
introduce diverse national rules to certain conditions as well as to Community review. 53 Article 100A imposes three limitations on the ability of
a Member State to "opt-out." The first limitation is the requirement
that a Member State have "major needs" for opting out.54 As yet,
"major needs" has not been defined. It may be that "major needs"
should be read as simply referring to all the grounds for Article 30
exceptions mentioned in Article 36. 5 5 The second limitation is based on

the Court's narrow construction of Article 36 exceptions to the Community's prohibition on States erecting trade barriers. The Court has limited the availability of these exceptions by imposing additional
requirements that must be satisfied before a State can take advantage of
an exception. 56 The final limitation is that the "opting-out" provision
only applies to measures enacted by a qualified majority. If a Community standard is adopted by unanimous decision, then the Article 100A
"opting out" provision is not available to a Member State that wants to
57
implement more stringent national standards.
4.

The Force of Economic Integration in Creating Community Environmental
Policies

The Community promotes economic integration when it integrates
national environmental policies into a single Community-wide environmental policy. When the Council 58 adopts a Community-wide harmonizing proposal, the directive becomes binding on the Member States.
The Commission enjoys authority to enforce these directives by bring52. Single European Act, supra note 22, at 749.

53. See Haagsma, supra note 26, at 351-352.
54. Id. at 352.
55. Id.

56. Such limitations include, for example: the requirement to choose the instrument that would least hinder intra-community trade and the "proportionality"
requirement, which requires that the measure's negative effects are not disproportionate to the objective pursued. See infra notes 94-104 and accompanying text.
57. This has been a source of dispute within the Community. For example, Denmark has unilaterally declared the right to enact stricter standards when it has considered certain Community measures issued under Article 100A to be inadequate for
safeguarding the environment. Kraemer, The Single EuropeanAct and Environment Protection: Reflection on Several New Provisions in Community Law, 24 COMM. MKT. L.R. 659,
680-82 (1987).

58. The Council makes the final decision on most Community legislation, makes
agreements with foreign countries, and together with Parliament decides on the

Community budget. T. C. HARTLEY, supra note 1, at 14.
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ing complaints to the Court.5 9
The Community's vehicle emission directive illustrates that the
goals of economic integration and environmental protection do not
always coincide. Early in the 1970's, the Community recognized that
Member States would be enacting measures to combat injurious vehicle
emissions. 60 Concerned that States might impose varying omission
standards that would negatively affect the Common Market, the Community proposed the vehicle emission directive as a means to implement
harmonizing Community-wide measures. By directing all Member
States to enforce the same emission standards, the Community sought
to prevent obstacles to free trade. 6 '
The directive was adopted only after serious environmental compromises were made to satisfy the self-interest concerns of certain Member States. 62 Because the chief concern of the directive was to prevent
trade barriers, States could not introduce measures more stringent than
those of the directive. For more than two years, Denmark blocked Community approval of the directive, claiming that the limits were too lenient. 6 3 The Commission finally broke the impasse by using qualified
majority voting as granted by SEA Article 100A. 64 The Commission
employed Article 100A-not Article 130S-on the basis that the directive's objective was "the establishment and functioning of the internal
65
market."
The vehicle emission directive was purportedly enacted for both
economic and environmental reasons; however, the directive promoted
economic integration while compromising environmental protection in
the Community. 6 6 The directive highlights the fact that, even though
59. Article 169 authorizes the Commission to bring before the Court ofJustice of
the European Communities those cases in which it considers "that a Member State
has failed to fulfill any of its obligations under... [the] Treaty." Treaty, supra note 1,
at art. 169. The Commission also drafts proposals for new Community policies,
negotiates with Member States to secure adoption of those proposals, coordinates
Member States' policies, and manages execution of Community policies. T. C. HARTLEY, supra note 1, at 8.
60. See Lomas, supra note 1, at 528.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 524-29 for a detailed explanation of the circumstances surrounding
the vehicle emission directives; see also Note, Convention on Long-Range Transboundary
Air Pollution: Meeting the Challenge of InternationalCooperation, 30 HARV. INT'L LJ. 447,
465-467 (1989) (authored by Amy A. Frankel) [hereinafter Note, The Convention on
Long-Range TransboundaryAir Pollution]. Member States are concerned that the financial costs incurred in complying with environmental directives, such as achieving the
required emission reductions, will detrimentally effect their national economies and
thus their competitive positions. Lomas, supra note 1, at 524-29.
63. Council Agrees to Allow Individual States to Tighten Car Exhaust Emission Standards,
10 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 368-69 (1987).
64. Lomas, supra note 1, at 531. After a majority of the Council agreed, the European Parliament approved the adoption of the directive. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 514. The final solution represented a significant compromise from the
original proposal. Id. Yet, it was deemed a success by its very existence-actual
emission limits applied to all Member States. Id. In addition, manufacturers now
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"environmental policy demands stringent emission standards, all that is
needed to satisfy the requirements of economic integration is that standards be uniform (or, at least subject to a uniform maximum requirement,
so that industry knows what it has to do to be granted free access to the
'6 7
whole of the European market)."
5.

The Community's Present Environmental Action Program

The Community is now in what is called its Fourth Action Program
(1987-1992).68 Armed with the clear environmental objectives provided
by the SEA, the Council approved an ambitious environmental program
in October 1987.69 The program uses a carrot-and-stick approach to
accomplish environmental objectives. The stick takes the form of regulations and directives that impose Community-wide standards and
prohibitions. 70 Focusing on Member States' persistent failure fully to
comply and to implement environmental directives, the program makes
clear that the Commission intends to enforce environmental measures
71
far more rigorously than it has in the past.
The program uses enforcement to overcome institutional limitations that constrain the Community's environmental progress. Member
States, not Community institutions, 7 2 implement and administer directives. Because the Community's role is to agree on common policies
and to legislate, 73 it must rely on the Commission to take Member States
to Court to enforce Community environmental initiatives. These institutional limitations hinder the success of Community environmental
know the maximum emission standards that any Member State can demand; so long
as they comply with these standards they will have free access to all Member States'
markets. Id. at 525.
67. Id-at 514.
68. The Council approved the Fourth Action Program on the environment on
October 19, 1987. Geddes, 1992 and the Environment-Sovereignty Well Lost? 138 NEW
LJ. 826 (November 11, 1988). "The breadth of the [Fourth Action Program's]
objectives and the complexity of its detail sets out to achieve nothing less than a
revolution in the way Community man treats the earth, sea and air which surround
him and on which he depends for his existence." Id.
69. Id.; see also 10 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 682 (1987).
70. Geddes, supra note 68, at 827. Examples include standards to reduce emissions and improve water purity and to ban certain chemicals harmful to the atmosphere. Id71. Id.; 9 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 41 (1986). Directives are the Community's
main means for enacting environmental policy. See generally Lomas, supra note 1, at
508 n. 11. Implementation of the directives becomes the responsibility of the Member States, which have a tendency to delay or only partially implement or otherwise
seek to circumvent the directives. Id. Because the Community enjoys no policing
power over the Member States, the Community is left to bring enforcement actions
before the Court. Id. The result has been an "enforcement deficit" of Community
environmental programs. Id. See also European ParliamentScores Failure of Commission to
Enforce Directives, 10 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 264 (1987).
72. See generally D. LAsoK &J. W. BRIDGE, supra note 1, at 332-36; T. C. HARTLEY,
supra note 1,at 102-03.
73. Lomas, supra note 1, at 509.

Cornell InternationalLaw Journal

Vol. 24

policies.7 4
C. Judicially Invalidating National Laws to Further Economic
Integration
The SEA specifically allows a Member State to enact more stringent
environmental standards than other States so long as the higher standards are not open or disguised barriers to intra-Community trade. 7 5 A
Member State that requires products to meet environmental standards
higher than those of other States could be accused of barring competing
goods of other States and impeding intra-Community trade. 76 Likewise,
a Member State that imposes lax standards on its own industrial
processes, such as waste disposal, could be accused of unfairly helping
77
its own industries.
For many years, the Community relied upon harmonization directives as its principal weapons against trade restrictions. 78 More recently,
the Community has adopted a new strategy of using the Court to eliminate trade restrictions. 79 Although the Treaty forbids trade restrictions
in several of its provisions, the Court has focused primarily on Article 30
and the free movement of goods in developing case law delineating permissible restrictions on trade.80
1.

The Court's Invalidation of National Measures Creating Quantitative
Restrictions on Trade

The most general Treaty provision relating to import restrictions is Article 30, which broadly prohibits barriers to the free movement of goods
within the Community. 8 1 More specifically, Article 30 requires the elimination of quantitative restrictions8 2 on the free movement of goods, as
well as measures having the equivalent effect, unless such measures are
consistent with the Treaty. 83 Because the Treaty fails to define these
74. Id. at 509. The Community is conveniently able to duck the difficult and
problematic issue of Member-States' implementation. Id.
75. Single European Act, supra note 22, at 749.
76. Greening Europe, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 14, 1989, at 21.
77. Id.
78. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
79. This strategy is a result of the Court's landmark decision in Rewe-Zentrale v.
Bundesmonopolverwaltung, known as "Cassis de Dijon." M. CAPPELLETrI, M. SECCOMBE
&J. WEILER, 3 INrEGRATION THROUGH LAW: METHODS, TooLs AND INSIrTrTIONs 212
(1985). "[lIt cannot be denied that it ["Cassis de Dijon"] will allow the removal of a
number of serious barriers to trade without need for the cumbersome and time-consuming integration process set in motion by harmonization directives." Id. For a
discussion of the deficiencies in using harmonization directives to remove trade
restrictions, see Note, West German "Beer Purity Case", supra note 19, at 756-757.

80. E.

REHBINDER

& R.

STEWART,

supra note 1, at 28-31.

81. F. BURROWS, supra note 10, at 38.
82. A simple example of a quantitative restriction would be where a state prohibits the import of goods in excess of certain quotas. Article 30 clearly forbids measures that restrict the amount of any good which may be imported from another
Member State. See id at 39.
83. Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 30; see also F. BURROWS, supra note 10, at 38-39.

1991

National Environmental Laws in the EC

84
concepts, the power to define them has fallen upon the Court.
In Procureurdu Roi v. Dassonville,8 5 the Court began delineating the
scope of Article 30 by defining quantitative restrictions as "[a]ll trading
rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly
or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade." 8 6 This
prohibition includes not only facially discriminatory measures against
foreign producers, but also facially neutral measures that, in effect, erect
barriers to interstate trade. 8 7 Thus, this definition focuses on a national
regulation's effect, rather than its purpose, to determine whether the
regulation violates Article 30.88 This broad definition, known as the
"Dassonville formula," has been repeatedly applied in a continuing line
of cases.8 9
The Court has limited the scope of the Article 30 exceptions provided by Article 36,90 which sets forth considerations that a Member
State may use to justify a quantitative trade restriction or equivalent
measure. 9 1 The Court summed up its attitude toward Article 36 in Commission v. Italy92 where it said that the Article 36 exceptions must be narrowly construed and not extended. 93 A Member State may only rely on
Article 36 to justify a restrictive measure that protects a matter specifi-

84. D. LAsoK &J. W. BRIDGE, supra note 1, at 388.
85. Procureurdu Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 837, 2 Comm. Mkt.

L.R. 436 (1974). The case arose when Scotch whiskey that had found its way to
France was imported into Belgium without a certificate of origin from the British
customs authorities, even though Belgian law required such a certificate. Id. The
Court found that the importer could have obtained the certificate with significant
difficulty, whereas a person importing directly from Britain could have obtained it
with ease. Id. Because the certificate requirement was more burdensome to indirect
importers than to direct importers, the measure became equivalent to a quantitative
restriction and therefore prohibited. Id. The decision stands for the proposition that
"[o]nce goods are on the market, their movements across frontiers between Member
States ought not to be impeded." F. BURROWS, supra note 10, at 41.
86. Procureurdu Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 852, 2 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. at 453-454 (1974).
87. Id; see also E. REHBINDER & R. STEWART, supra note 1, at 28-29.
88. See Note, West German "Beer Purity" Case, supra note 19, at 760.
89. See M. CAPPELLErrI, M. SECCOMBE &J. WEILER, supra note 79, at 197-98. The
Commission adopted this definition in Commission Directive No. 70/50 of 22 Dec.
1969. Id.
90. F. BURROWS, supra note 10, at 62. Article 36 provides in pertinent part,
The provisions of Articles 30 to 34 inclusive shall not be an obstacle to
prohibitions or restrictions in respect of importation, exportation or transit
which are justified on grounds of public morality, public order, public safety,
the protection of human or animal life, or health, the preservation of plant
life, the protection of national treasures of artistic, historical or archeological
value or the protection of industrial or commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute either a means of arbitrary
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States.
Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 36.
91. Id.
92. Commission v. Italy, 1982 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 2187 (Italy required importers
of goods to furnish a security or bank guarantee of five percent of the value of goods
when payment was made in advance).

93. Id.
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4
cally listed in Article 36.9
Even if a Member State's measure falls within one of the Article 36
exceptions, the Court requires that the measure not violate the principle
of proportionality. 9 5 This principle prescribes that restrictions on free
movement of goods must be no more restrictive than reasonably
required to achieve a legitimate objective. 96 Therefore, a Member
State's regulations will not be justified by Article 36 if the objective
could be achieved by other measures that restrict free trade less and that
97
could reasonably be adopted.
The second sentence of Article 3698 also requires that a national
measure may not be a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised
restriction on trade. 99 For example, in Commission v. France,10 0 the Court
held that certain laws restricting the advertising of alcoholic beverages
and enacted to protect public health amounted to arbitrary discrimination. The law did not ban advertising of all alcoholic beverages, and the
Court found that the State enforced the law to give domestic products
an advantage over imported products.'10 A national measure genuinely
aimed to achieve an Article 36 objective may therefore discriminate
t0 2
against imports only if it does not do so arbitrarily.

94. F. BURROWS, supra note 10, at 62. Thus, consumer protection measures cannot be justified under Article 36 because they are not specifically mentioned. Id. at
59-60; see also Note, West German "Beer Purity" Case, supra note 19, at 761. For example, in Commission v. Ireland the court stated, "in view of the fact that neither the protection of consumers nor the fairness of commercial transactions is included amongst
the exceptions set out in Article 36, those grounds cannot be relied upon as such in
connection with that article." 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1625, 1638, 1 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 706, 716 (1982) (Ireland required that imported souvenir jewelry be marked
"foreign").
95. F. BURROWS, supra note 10, at 62.
96. Id.; see e.g., Commission v. United Kingdom, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 203, 235,
2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 1, 27 (1983) (where British regulations impaired other states'
ability to import "Ultra Heat Treated" milk and the court refused to apply Article 36
to justify a restriction on trade when alternatives existed that impeded trade less and
protected animal health as effectively).
97. See F. BURROWS, supra note 10, at 62. The court adopted this view of proportionality inAdriaan dePeijper, 1976 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 613, 636,2 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
271, 304 (1976). In Adriaan de Peijper,a Dutch law required that parallel importers of
pharmaceutical products submit to the national health authorities specific documents
that could be procured only from the product's manufacturer or from an appointed
distributor. Id. The court decided that the public health could be protected as effectively by alternative measures which would restrict trade less. The Dutch law had the
effect of making all parallel importers of pharmaceutical products dependent on the
good will of the manufacturer or of the official distributor. Id. The court thus held
that Article 36 did not save the measure from being contrary to Article 30. Id.
98. F. BURROWS, supra note 10, at 63.
99. Id.
100. Commission v. French Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2299.
101. Id.; see also F. BURROWS, supra note 10, at 63. The advertising ban applied to
"grain" alcohols and not alcohols made from cane sugar or wine and fruits-of which
France is a major producer-even though it did apply to certain domestic products,
such as "pastis." Commission v. France, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2299; see also M.
CAPPELLE'rI, M. SECCOMBE &J. WEILER, supra note 79, at 198.
102. See M. CAPPELLETrI, M. SECCOMBE &J. WEILER, supra note 79, at 198-199.
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Although Article 30 does not use the term "discrimination," it factors consistently into the Court's evaluations of national measures
imposing trade restrictions. For the Article 30 purpose, discrimination
arises when national regulations advantage domestic products and disadvantage imports. l0 3 When a national rule basically distinguishes
between intra-Community trade and domestic trade and thereby disadvantages the former, it discriminates.1 0 4 Similarly, when a national rule,
equally applicable on its face to both imported and domestic goods, in
10 5
practice disadvantages imported goods, the rule discriminates.
In sum, the Court has construed Article 30 broadly and read Article
36's permissible restrictions narrowly. If a national measure makes the
imported products of other States more difficult to sell or more costly
10 6
than domestic products, it likely constitutes a prohibited restriction.
2.

"Cassis de Dijon" and the "Rule of Reason" Exception for Quantitative
Restrictions

The Court has tempered the very wide definition given to Article 30
10 7
prohibitions by creating an exception known as the "rule of reason".
10 8
In Rewe-Zentrale v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung,
known as the "Cassis de
Dijon" decision, the Court expanded the exceptions to Article 30
beyond those laid out in Article 36.109 The Court developed a public
policy (reasonableness) test whereby Member States may regulate products outside of Article 36 exceptions to satisfy "mandatory requirements" even where the legislation restricts trade and would otherwise
be prohibited under Article 30.110
In "Cassis de Dijon" a German firm wanted to import Cassis de
Dijon's well-known French liqueur.1 1 ' The German authorities allowed
importation but prohibited sale on the grounds that German law
required a minimum alcohol content for liqueurs and that the alcohol
content of Cassis de Dijon was not sufficiently high.' 12 The Court ruled
that in the absence of Community rules, Member States may, in limited
circumstances, regulate the production and marketing of alcohol on
their own territories."13 It said,
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

F. BURROWS, supra note 10, at 50-54.

Id.
Id

M. SECCOMBE &J. WEILER, supra note 79, at 198.
supra note 14, at 51-52, 71. The "rule of reason" is "arecognition of the need, pending action at the Community level, to allow the Member States
to act to ensure that certain interests or values are guaranteed in the general interest." Id. at 57.
108. Case 120/78, 1979 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep., at 649, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R., at 494
(1979).
109. L. GORMLEY, supra note 14, at 51-52, 56; F. BURROWS, supra note 10, at 57.
110. Note, West Germany "Beer Purity" Case, supra note 19, at 763.
111. Rewe-Zentrale, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R., at 497 (1979).
M.

L.

CAPPELLETrI,

GORMLEY,

112. Id.
113. Id. at 508.
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In the absence of common rules relating to the production and marketing
of alcohol, it is for the Member States to regulate. Obstacles to movement within the Community resulting from disparities between the
national laws relating to the marketing of the products in question must
be accepted in so far as those provisions may be recognised as being necessary in order to satisfy mandatory requirements relating in particular to
the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, 1the
14
fairness of commercial transactions and the defence of the consumer.
On general grounds of public policy, the Court in "Cassis de Dijon"
clearly added additional escape routes, not within Article 36 exceptions,
to Article 30.115 Nevertheless, the Court struck down the German
restriction. Germany defended the law against an Article 30 attack on
grounds that the minimum alcohol content requirement aimed to protect public health, to protect consumers from fraud, and to suppress
unfair competition. 1 6 The Court found that the restriction's impediment to the free movement of goods was not necessary to accomplish
these objectives. 1 17 Therefore, though these objectives could legitimately provide Article 30 exceptions under the "rule of reason," the
Court dismissed the German arguments on the facts."18
The "Cassis de Dijon" case provided a significant exception to the
"Dassonville formula" for quantitative restrictions. 11 9 The decision
firmly established that, in the absence of Community rules, a Member
State could enact non-discriminatory measures that created Article 30
trade restrictions if necessary for one of four reasons: effectiveness of
fiscal supervision, protection of public health, fairness of commercial
1 20
transactions, or defense of the consumer.
Although in "Cassis de Dijon" the Court introduced the "rule of
reason," it also indicated a new strategy for abolishing trade restrictions.' 2 1 In what is known as the "Cassis proviso," the Court stated,
"[t]here is therefore no valid reason why, provided that they have been
lawfully produced and marketed in one of the Member States, alcoholic
beverages should not be introduced into any other Member State
....
,,122 "Cassis de Dijon" has been viewed as establishing the tenet
that any product which is legally manufactured and marketed in a Mem114. Id. at 508-09.
115. See B. RUDDEN, BASIC COMMUNrrY CASES 77 (1987); L. GORMLEY, supra note

14, at
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

71.
Rewe-Zentrale, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R., at 503 (1979).
Idl
Id.
F. BURROWS, supra note 10, at 60.
Id.; B. RUDDEN, supra note 115, at 74.
M. CAPPELLMErI, M. SECCOMBE &J. WEILER, supra note 79, at 212-213. Until

the courts ruling in "Cassis de Dijon,"
* * . there seemed to be little alternative to harmonization as [a] means to
abolish barriers to interstate trade ... The Commission saw in this judgment
the possibility of reducing its harmonization program while still pursuing its
goal of abolishing quantitative restrictions.
Pheasant, ProtectionistMeasures in Community Trade, 125 SOLIC. J. 362 (198 1).
122. Rewe-Zentrale, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R., at 510 (1979).
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ber State must be free to enter all other Member States.1 23 Although it
can be doubted that "Cassis de Dijon" really stands for such a broad
clearly paved the way for the Court to remove
principle, the decision
124
barriers to trade.
Therefore, "Cassis de Dijon" simultaneously broadened and narrowed the scope of Article 30's restriction on trade barriers. Under the
"rule of reason," Member States may promulgate laws that effectively
erect trade barriers as long as the law is justified by the public policy
considerations enumerated in "Cassis de Dijon." However, the decision
also stands for the rule that any product legally manufactured in one
Member State may be sold in any other.

II. Re DisposableBeer Cans: E.C. Commission v. Denmark
(Case 302/86)
Returning bottles to gain the deposit has long been the practice in Denmark. 12 5 The custom began with a deposit charged in order to
encourage consumers to return their beer and soft drink bottles voluntarily. The system worked well on a voluntary basis-the number of different bottles used was limited, and where soft drinks were marketed by
foreign producers, they were frequently made under license, or at least
bottled, in Denmark. For a long time, the countryside and open spaces
remained free of empty, discarded bottles.
In the mid-1970s, this voluntary system became threatened by the
126
Producers comonslaught of cans and differently shaped bottles.
peted not only to make popular drinks but also to bottle drinks in
CAPPELLETTI, M. SECCOMBE &J. WEILER, supra note 79, at 212.
124. Id. The court has subsequently invoked "Cassis de Dijon" and invalidated
several national provisions as measures having equivalent effect; e.g., an Italian ban
on vinegar sales which excepted those made from wine in Gilli and Andres, 1980 E.
Comm.J. Rep. 2071, 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 146 (1981); a Danish requirement that the
word "likeur" appear on labels of all products having a specific composition and
containing ethyl alcohol, sugar, aromatic substances and/or fruit juice in Fietje, 1980
E. Comm.J. Rep. 3839, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 722 (1981); a Dutch requirement that the
amount of dry matter contained in bread fall within certain specified limits in Fabriek
voor Hoogwaardige Voedingsprodukten Kelderman BV,1981 E. Comm. J. Rep., at 527. M.
CAPPELLETrI, M. SECCOMBE &J. WEILER, supra note 79, at 212-213. Many of these
condemned national regulations were genuinely aimed to protect consumers, yet the
court considered the seriousness of the impediments to free trade which they created
to constitute measures that could not be justified, especially since alternative measures could have adequately protected the consumers. Id.
125. Opinion of Advocate General, Commission v. Denmark, I Comm. Mkt. L.R., at
619, 622 (1989).
According to Article 166, "[t]he duty of the advocate-general shall be to present
publicly, with complete impartiality and independence, reasoned conclusions on
cases submitted to the Court ofJustice, with a view to assisting the latter in the performance of its duties .. ." Treaty, supra note I, at 74. The Advocate General participates in every case before the court and although his opinion does not constitute the
judgment, it forms a part of the adjudicating process. D. LASOK &J. W. BRIDGE, supra
note 1, at 174.
126. Opinion of Advocate General, Commission v. Denmark, 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R., at
622 (1989).

123. M.
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appealing containers. 127 The resulting discarded bottles triggered the
need to protect the environment, to conserve resources and to reduce
legislation to
the increasing rubbish. In response, Denmark introduced
128
ensure the continuing vitality of the deposit system.
The result was Denmark's Order 397 of July 2, 1981,129 which
applies to containers for gaseous mineral waters, lemonade, soft drinks
and beer sold in Denmark. Under the Order, containers must be reusable, there must be a system of collection and refilling under which a
large proportion of containers used would be refilled, and the containers must be approved by the National Environmental Protection Agency
("Agency").13 0 In addition, distributors must set up and operate a system of deposit-and-return to encourage the recuperation of used containers and their reinsertion into the production cycle. In order to take
account of the difficulty that producers of foreign drinks might face,
Denmark added derogations to the Order's requirements. 13 1 The derogations permitted a producer to market a drink in unapproved containers up to a maximum of 3,000 hectoliters per year' 3 2 and entitled
foreign producers a limited use of unapproved containers when testing
33
the market.'
Producers of beverages and containers in other Member States and
the European associations representing the retail trade complained that
127. Id.
128. Denmark introduced legislation, Law No. 297 on June 8, 1978 which applied
to, inter alia, containers used for drinks and was expressed to be an anti-pollution
measure. The Act empowered the Minister to "introduce rules limiting or prohibiting the use of certain materials and types of container ... or requiring the use of
certain materials and types of containers," to promulgate rules introducing compulsory deposits for certain types of containers and to fix the amount of such deposits.
In addition, the Act provided for the National Environmental Protection Agency
("Agency") to oversee the detailed administration of the law, and provided notification requirements. Id.
129. Denmark issued Order No. 397 under the powers delegated by Law No. 297.

Id.
130. The Agency considers the following factors: (1) whether the container is
technically adapted to use in a deposit-and-return system, (2) whether the system for
returning containers is designed so as to ensure that a high proportion of containers
is actually returned, and (3) whether approval has already been granted to an alternative container of equal capacity which is both available and suited to the intended
use. Id.
Since introduction of the Order, one further bottle type had been approved and no
request for type approval had been rejected by the Agency at the time of this case.
Id. at 623.
131. The Danish government added the derogations by Order 95 on March 16,
1984. Id.

132. It appears that this 3,000 h derogation is available to Danish producers and
to importers of beverages manufactured outside Denmark alike. Id.
133. The measures gives this derogation for test-marketing only to importers of
beverages manufactured outside Denmark. Id. Denmark added this derogation in
response to a Commission decision that provisions of the Act ran contrary to Article
30. Id. Producers of beverages and containers in other Member States and European associations representing the retail trade had protested that the containers in
which drinks were normally sold could not be used in Denmark and that the collection system increased the costs involved. Id.
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the Denmark Order prohibited use of many common containers. They
said the costs of the Danish measure erased the profit to be made in the
small market. 13 4 The challengers also argued that in practice the measure prevented foreign producers from importing into Denmark beer
and soft drinks in their original containers because the Order made
establishing a collection system administratively difficult and expensive.13 5 The Commission responded by taking Denmark to Court.
A. The Proceedings
The Commission brought this action before the Court in December
1986 and challenged the Danish system as contrary to Article 30.136
The Commission asserted that a system achieving either reuse or.
recycling was sufficient to achieve the environmental aim. Moreover, it
claimed that to limit the volume of the product that could be test-marketed in unapproved bottles or the period during which a test could be
3 7
made was insufficient to overcome trade barriers that the law erected.'
The Commission considered the question as whether and to what extent
protection of the environment has precedence over the principle of a
Common Market without national frontiers. 13 8 It stressed its worry
that, in the future, Member States could take refuge behind environmental arguments to avoid opening their markets to beer and soft
39
drinks, even though the Court has previously required open markets. 1
In response, Denmark accused the Commission of disregarding the
increasing environmental awareness throughout Europe. 140 In some
cases, Denmark argued, environmental protection policies may take priority over the free movement of goods. 14 1 According to Denmark, free
Community objective, but not one to
movement remains a fundamental
14 2
be achieved "at any price."
The Court thus described the issue before it as difficult and sensitive-"the compatibility of measures taken to protect the environment
with the fundamental rule of the EEC Treaty that quantitative restric134. Transcript of Commission v. Denmark, The Times, London, (LEXIS, NEXIS
library, INTL file) Oct. 3, 1988 [hereinafter Transcript].
135. Id.

136. Prior to the present proceedings, the Commission issued a letter of formal
notice and a further reasoned opinion. Opinion of Advocate General, Commission v.
Denmark, I Comm. Mkt. L.R., at 623 (1989).
137. Id.
138. Transcript supra note 134. While not challenging the objective of protecting

the environment, the Commission felt that the level of protection should not be fixed
exaggeratedly high so that other solutions could be accepted even if they were a little
less effective. Id. See also European Law Report: Drink Can Limit is Disproportionate,The
Times (London), Oct. 3, 1988, at 35.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. Denmark conceded that environmental measures must not be excessive
under Community law and added that measures are excessive only if other measures
existed that would be just as effective and less restrictive of intra-Community trade.

Id.
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to imports into one
tions and measures of equivalent effect in relation
143
Member State from another are unlawful."'
The Court first declared that the Danish measures amounted to a
measure equivalent to a quantitative restriction. 144 Relying on the
"Dassonville formula,"' 4 5 the Court found that the environmental
measures plainly constituted "trading rules enacted by Member States
which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade."' 146 In prior cases, the Court had already
determined that national packaging requirements constitute measures
capable of affecting trade between Member States. 14 7 The Court held
that the Danish rules either restricted or were capable of obstructing the
use of beer and soft drink containers that were lawfully marketed in a
Member State. Further, the deposit, collection and reutilization requirements were equally capable of restricting the movement of goods within
the Community. Therefore, the Court held that Denmark had prima
facie adopted measures contrary to Article 30.148
B.

Protection of the Environment Constitutes a "Mandatory
Requirement" Justifying a "Rule of Reason" Exception to
Article 30

The environmental measures, which seemed to violate Article 30,
should be struck down, unless justified under the "rule of reason"
exception laid out in "Cassis de Dijon".' 49 The fate of Denmark's environmental measure depended on whether it was necessary for the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness
143. Opinion of Advocate General, Commission v. Denmark, I Comm. Mkt. L.R. at

621 (1989).
144. Id at 624.
145. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
146. Opinion of Advocate General, Commission v. Denmark, 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at
624 (1989) (citing Procureurdu Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep., at 837,
852, 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R., at 436, 453-454 (1974)).
147. Id. at 624 (citing Case 261/81 Rau v. De Smedt, 1902 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at
3961, 3972, 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 496, at para. 12 (1983); Case 104/75 De Pejper,
1976 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 613, 635, 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 271, 304 (1976); Case 16/
83, Prand, 1984 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1299, 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 238, at para. 25
(1985)).
148. Denmark had adopted "trading rules . . .which are capable of hindering,
directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade" so that such
rules are "to be considered as measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative
restrictions." Case 8/74 ProcureurDuRoi v. Dassonville, 1974 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at
852, 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 453-454 (1974). In addition, Denmark's rules did not fall
within any of the exceptions contained in Article 36. Opinion of Advocate General,
Commission v. Denmark, I Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 624 (1989).
149. The Court stated the principle announced in "Cassis de Dijon" that "[in the
absence of common rules relating to ... production and marketing ... it is for the
Member State to regulate all matters relating to the production and marketing... in
their own territory." Id. (citing Rewe-Zentrale v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung, 1979 E.
Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 649, 3 Comm. Mkt. L. R. at 494, para. 8 (1979)).

1991

National Environmental Laws in the EC

of commercial transactions or the defense of the consumer. 150 The
Court considered whether environmental protection should be added to
the list constituted of mandatory requirements within "Cassis de Dijon."
The Court surveyed various Community directives aimed at protecting the environment 5 1 as evidence that the Community had recognized the importance of environmental protection policies.
For
instance, Directive 85/339152 specifically concerns recycling or reusing
waste materials used in containers of liquids for human consumption.
Directive 80/777153 requires that mineral waters be bottled only in
accordance with the directive requiring natural mineral water to be
transported in the same containers that are distributed to the ultimate
consumer. The Court also found significant that the Single European
Act expressly adds environmental protection to the Community's objectives. Moreover, the Commission had already recognized and the Court
had accepted the importance of environmental protection as a potential
limitation on the prohibitions contained in Article 30.154 "[T]he principle of free trade is not to be viewed in absolute terms but is subject to
certain limits justified by the objectives of general interest pursued by
the Community [and] environmental protection.., is one of the Community's essential objectives." The Court announced that, in the
absence of Community rules, national environmental measures might
constitute "mandatory requirements" which may limit the application of
Article 30.155

150. The court presented the issue as whether the "obstacles to movement within
the Community... relating to the marketing of the products.., must be accepted in
so far as [the] provisions may be recognized as being necessary in order to satisfy
mandatory requirements relating in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of commercial transactions and the
defense of the consumer." Id.
151. Id at 624-625.
152. The directive, however, also recites that measures taken by Member States
must comply with Treaty rules concerning the free movement of goods. Directive
85/339, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 176) 18 (1985). Opinion of Advocate General, Commission v. Denmark, 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 624-625 (1989). It does not specify the
degree of environmental protection to be achieved nor the methods to be adopted.
It simply requires that Member States develop "consumer education in the advantages of refilling or recycling containers, to facilitate the refilling and/or recycling of
containers and as regards non-refillable containers, to provide for their selective collection, to retrieve them from household waste, and to maintain and, where possible,
increase the proportion of refill and/or recycled containers." Directive 85/339, supra
at 624-25.
153. Directive 80/777, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 229) 1 (1980). Opinion of Advocate General, Commission v. Denmark, 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 625 (1989).
154. Opinion of Advocate General, Commission v. Denmark, 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at
630 (1989); Procureur De La Republique v. Association de Defense Des Bruleurs D'Huiles
Saugees (Adbhu), Case 240/83, 1985 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 531, paras. 12, 13.
155. Commission v. Denmark, I Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 631 (1989); supra notes 107-15
and accompanying text.
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The Court Subjects the Danish Measure to Article 30 Limitations

Although the Court recognized that national environmental measures
may potentially limit Article 30, it tempered its position by stating that
"Cassis de Dijon" does not give Member States carte blanche to enact
environmental protection legislation.' 5 6 The Court noted several
restrictions on Member States. It said that the level of protection aimed
for must not be excessive or unreasonable and the measures taken must
be necessary and proportional. 1 5 7 Further, the measures must be
"indistinctly applicable" in form and in substance to domestic producers
and to producers from other Member States.158
The Court first addressed the Commission's claim that the Danish
regulations infringed the principle of proportionality1 59 because Denmark could protect the environment with alternative measures, less
restrictive of trade. The Court, following "Cassis de Dijon," asked
whether all the restrictions imposed on the free movement of goods by
60
the Danish measure were necessary to achieve its stated objectives.'
The Court decided that the measure was necessary to attain the
Danish law's objective of environmental protection. 16 1 It based its conclusion on the finding that the obligation to create a deposit and return
system for empty containers constituted an essential element of a system
aiming to secure the re-use of containers. Thus, restrictions imposed on
the free movement of goods by this measure would not be considered
62
disproportionate.1
The Court found a problem with the requirement that manufacturers and importers use only containers approved by the National Environmental Protection Agency. Denmark claimed that the law's
effectiveness would be reduced if the number of approved containers
exceeded thirty because retailers who had joined the system would not
be prepared to accept too many types of bottles. 163 The Commission
pointed out that with the approval system Denmark could prevent a foreign producer from selling in Denmark even if the producer re-used
returned containers. 164 Consequently, a foreign producer wishing to
sell in Denmark would be compelled to manufacture or purchase containers of a type already approved. This would entail considerable extra
156. Id.
157. See supra notes 95-105 and accompanying text.
158. Opinion of the Advocate General, Commission v. Denmark, 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
at 625-26 (1989). Measures must not be discriminatory. See supra notes 99-105 and
accompanying text.
159. Commission v. Denmark, 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 626-27 (1989).
160. Id. at 631.
161. Id.
162. Id. The measure did not offend the doctrine of proportionality. See supra

notes 95-105 and accompanying text.
163. This burden came from the increased handling costs and the greater storage

space needed for the additional types of bottles. Commission v. Denmark, 1 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. at 631 (1989). To ease the burden on retailers, the Agency has generally

seen that new approvals are accompanied by the withdrawal of existing approvals. Id.
164. Id.
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165
cost and make it very burdensome to import into Denmark.
The Court found that the derogation allowing a producer to market
up to 3,000 hectoliters a year in non-approved containers failed to remedy this defect. It noted that because the system for approved containers guaranteed maximum re-use since the empty containers could be
returned to any beverage retailer, it protected the environment considerably. 166 In contrast, the system for non-approved containers was also
designed to protect the environment, but the 3,000 hectoliters derogation reduced the system's coverage to limited quantities of beverages.
The Court found that limiting the quantity of products which could be
disproportionate to the objective of protectmarketed by importers was
67
ing the environment.'
In sum, the requirement permitting only containers that have been
approved by the Agency made the law disproportionate to the aim of
protecting the environment. The Court held that the law, which
restricted the free movement of goods, was not necessary to attain the
legislation's objectives. Protection of the environment, however, could
be achieved with means less restrictive of trade. Consequently, in so far
as the approval requirement hindered the imports of drinks from other
Member States, the measure contravened Article 30. Finally, the concession allowing a limited use of non-approved containers failed to cure
the illegality. Therefore, Denmark had failed to fulfill its obligations
under Article 30 of the Treaty to ensure a free market for products from
168
other Member States.

m.

Analysis

Commission v. Denmark gave the Court its first opportunity to address a
national environmental law challenged as being "protectionist." To further economic integration and move toward achieving a Common Market, the Court has intervened when national measures impede free
trade. When Denmark's measure faced a challenge for obstructing the
165. Producers in other Member States are faced with alternatives of either
returning empty bottles to their own plants in their own states or setting up plants to
make beer or to bottle it from barrels imported into Denmark. Both alternatives
impose appreciable extra costs. Id. at 627-628. Accordingly, the court found the
requirement that the Agency be satisfied that the system would guarantee the reuse

of a large number of containers imposed a considerable burden on importer producers. Id. at 631-632.
The Advocate General referred to Council Directive 85/339 and the 3,000 hi derogation, both of which recognized recycling as an alternative to reutilization. Id at
628. The Advocate General considered that as long as bottles are returned or collected the countryside remains free of debris. Id. at 629. Because he considered reutilization not necessary for this purpose, the Advocate General rejected the obligatory reutilization as it seriously inhibited the free movement of goods. Id.

166. In contrast, non-approved containers can only be returned to the retailer who
sold the beverage because of the impossibility of setting up an organization for nonapproved containers similar to the one for approved containers. Id. at 632.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 623.
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free movement of goods, the Court announced a strategy for evaluating
national environmental measures capable of creating trade barriers.
Because the Danish measures imposed standards stricter than those
of the Community, environmental protection objectives collided with
economic integration. Commission v. Denmark highlights the fact that
perfecting environmental quality demands maximum reduction of
waste, but any law designed to reduce discarded containers must be uniform among the Member States.' 69 The objectives of economic integration and environmental protection thus lie in conflict.
Further, while economic integration, in particular the free movement of goods, requires that all producers have free access to all
national markets, environmental policy is inherently protectionist. In
other words, environmental policy, such as national product requirements, creates barriers to trade.1 70 Because the Community includes
environmental protection among its objectives, the Court in Commission
v. Denmark had to decide where to draw the line between environmental
protection and economic integration.
A.

Commission v. Denmark as a Landmark Decision Giving Member
States Room for Strict Environmental Measures

Commission v. Denmark is the Court's first decision to allow Member States
to enact trade barriers on environmental grounds. Because the Court
backed Denmark, the decision marks a victory for environmentally
minded states. These Member States made strides in opposing Community prohibitions on national environmental legislation impeding intraCommunity trade.
While addressing the measure's restrictions on the free movement
of goods, the Court assessed Denmark's environmental objectives. The
Court faced conflicting Community interests: economic integration and
environmental protection.
The Court relied on judicial precedent and Community legislation
to sustain the legitimacy of Denmark's environmental protection objective. Earlier in Procureur de la Republique v. Association de Defense Res
Bruleurs D'Hiule Songees (A.D.D.H.U.), the Court had stated that environ7
mental protection was one of the Community's essential objectives.'1
More significantly, the SEA explicitly made environmental protection a
Community objective and allowed Member States to introduce measures
more stringent than the Community as long as they are compatible with
the Treaty. 172 Moreover, the Court had previously refused to view the
principle of free trade in absolute terms. Indeed the Court had sub169. See Lomas, supra note 1, at 532.
170. Rehbinder, Environmental Protection and the Law of International Trade, in THE
FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE ENVIRONMENT 357 (1985). National pro-

duction requirements impose additional costs on national industry. Id.
171. Procureurde la Republique v. A.D.D.H. U., 1985 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 531, 539.

172. Commission v. Denmark, 1988 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 4630, paras. 8, 9, 1
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 630 (1989).
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jected the principle of the free movement of goods to several judicially
created limitations. The Court has recognized environmental protection as a Member State goal that may legitimately justify obstructing free
1 73
movement of goods.
For the first time in Commission v. Denmark, the Court indicated that
environmental protection validly justified measures "having an effect
equivalent to quantitative restrictions." 1 74 The Court's decision indicates that it wanted to make environmental protection an exception to
the general bar against trade barriers similar to those exceptions provided in Article 36 and in the "Cassis de Dijon" decision. 17 5 Accordingly, the Court expanded the Article 30 "rule of reason" exception first
enumerated in "Cassis de Dijon" to include national environmental

measures. 176
The Court outlined a strategy for evaluating national environmental
legislation capable of creating trade barriers. In so doing, the Court
gave Member States room for enacting stringent environmental legislation. Until the Community harmonizes national environmental laws,
Member States may introduce their own laws, even if these laws contravene the free trade policy. This extension of the "Cassis de Dijon" principle to environmental issues gives countries freedom to introduce even
stricter environmental laws.
B.

The Court Subjects Member States' Freedom to Enact Stricter
Environmental Laws to Article 30 Limitations

Although Member States may limit application of Article 30 to their
environmental laws, the Court subjects this freedom to judicially created
limitations. Therefore, the level of protection sought by a Member State
in enacting environmental laws is restricted. Three such limitations can
be distinguished.
First, the Court provides that the freedom of Member States to
enact laws contrary to Article 30 arises "in the absence of common
rules."' 77 Member States may take advantage of the Court's rule unless
or until the Community acts. This rule does not address whether a
Member State can enact laws stricter than those of the Community.
Article 130S, however, does address this issue and allows Member States
to "opt-out" of Community rules. 178 As with the Court's decision in
Commission v. Denmark, the freedom to "opt-out" is not absolute; it is
1 79
restricted to national measures not incompatible with the Treaty.
173. Id.
174. "It was a big victory for the [C]ommission's environmental directorate over
the internal-market directorate, which had insisted on taking Denmark to court."
Greening Europe, supra note 76, at 22.
175. See supra notes 108-15 and accompanying text.
176. Id.
177. Commission v. Denmark, 1988 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 4629, para. 6, 1 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. at 630 (1989).

178. Single European Act, supra note 22, 2 CoMm.
179. Id.

MKT.

L. REV. at 755.
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The second restraint arises because the Court subjects this new
freedom to certain Article 30 limitations. For instance, the level of environmental protection sought by a Member State must not be excessive
or unreasonable in light of the Community's goal of removing intraCommunity trade barriers. Furthermore, the national measure must be
necessary and proportional to achieve its objective. This "proportionality" requirement requires that the measure not have negative effects disproportionate to the objective pursued.18 0
Third, the measure must be "indistinctly applicable" in form and in
substance to both domestic and foreign producers. In other words, the
measure must not discriminate against producers from other Member
States.181
The Court in Commission v. Denmark adopted the legal framework
developed in prior cases for interpreting Articles 30 and 36 in light of
the Community's goal of economic integration. The three limitations
above closely resemble those that limit the Article 36 exceptions to Article 30 developed in the Court's prior case law.' 8 2 Certainly the Community cannot "legalize" Member States' measures that run contrary to
Articles 30 and 36. Thus, the Court's limitations on Article 36 and
national environmental measures work to keep Member States' meas83
ures compatible with the Treaty.'
C.

National Environmental Protection after Commission v. Denmark

The future of national environmental law seems secured by precedent
after Commission v. Denmark. Both the SEA and Commission v. Denmark
illustrate that government power in the environmental sphere does not
reside solely with the Community. Both the Community and Member
States may introduce stringent environmental measures. Commission v.
Denmark provides assurance to Member States that national measures in
areas the Community has not yet addressed are protected from Community interferences.
1.

The Ability of Member States To Enact Environmental Laws Stricter than
Laws of Other States

The Community's primary political and legal objective of creating a
Common Market "would be thwarted" if Member States had unlimited
right to enact environmental legislation.' 8 4 The rationale used by the
Court in Commission v. Denmark should allow a Member State to regulate
products insofar as the national regulation does not create an unjustified
trade restriction.1 8 5 Under this rule, a Member State should be allowed
180. Commission v. Denmark, 1988 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 4630, paras. 10, 11; 1
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 630, paras. 10,11 (1989).
181. Supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
182. Id.
183. See generally Haagsma, supra note 26, at 352.
184. See generally Kraemer, supra note 57, at 680.
185. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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a degree of discretion in determining its environmental policies. It
should be afforded discretion to evaluate environmental risks of products and to determine its environmental quality objectives and the regu86
latory instruments necessary to achieve these objectives.'
Accordingly, a Member State should be free to implement productrelated measures so long as the measures are reasonable in light of the
long as the adopted measures do not
regulatory problem-that is, so
87
entail hidden protectionism.1
Commission v. Denmark, however, could be read as revealing that the
Court will judicially harmonize national environmental laws when necessary to protect economic integration. This negative harmonization
occurs when the Court judicially invalidates national laws that it considers incompatible with economic integration.' 8 8 Through negative harmonization the Court compels Community uniformity by dismantling
national regulations.
Arguably, the Court provided a firm legal framework for analyzing
national environmental laws in Commission v. Denmark. The Court closely
followed the precedent begun in "Cassis de Dijon" and developed in its
progeny. The Court will likely refrain from intervening in those
national environmental policies that do not run contrary to the rules
outlined in Commission v. Denmark.
2.

The Future of EnvironmentalProtection in the Member States

Before the SEA, Community action on the environment required unanimity in all cases.' 8 9 Therefore, before the SEA and Commission v. Denmark, environmentally minded Member States enjoyed a "guarantee
against unwanted Community intrusion" into areas covered by national
legislation. 19 0 The SEA did not remove this guarantee entirely because
Community measures still require unanimity when enacted under Artibrought
cle 130S. 19 1 Member States can conceivably "veto" proposals
9 2
under Article 130S that intrude upon their national powers.
Until the Community acts, Member States are normally free to regulate the production and marketing of goods. 193 In the future, a
national environmental measure that operates contrary to Article 30 by
impeding the free movement of goods will be subject to the limitations
given in Commission v. Denmark. In particular, the measures must neither
discriminate nor offend the principle of proportionality. Member States
thus retain an ability to regulate products in order to achieve environ186. See generally E. REHBINDER & R. STEWART, supra note 1, at 142-143.
187. Id See also Kraemer, supra note 57, at 681.
188. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
189. Single European Act, supra note 22, 2 COMM. MKT. L.
190. See Haagsma, supra note 26, at 357.

REV.

at 749.

191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See supra note 155 and accompanying text; see also L. GORMLEY, supra note 14,
at 235.
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mental objectives. 19 4
The Court's decision in Commission v. Denmark is potentially dangerous for national environmental policies if it is seen as negatively harmonizing national measures. 19 5 Negative harmonization could be viewed
as dismantling progressive national solutions for less effective solutions. 19 6 By judicially invalidating progressive environmental laws
because of conflict with the goal of economic integration, the Court in
effect freezes environmental protection standards at a level lower than
what may result if States and market forces are free to act.
Alternatively, however, this strategy may encourage action at the
Community level. 19 7 Environmentally tough states would be unable
to exclude products from environmentally lax states. This would give
environmentally tough states strong incentives to support harmonization in order to protect both their environmental quality and
8
competitiveness. 19

D. Displacing National Environmental Laws with Community-wide
Measures
The Court in Commission v. Denmark gave Member States room to enact
environmental measures stricter than those of other States in areas the
Community has not yet addressed. 199 If the Community has acted, the
SEA allows for "opting-out" so long as the Community measure was not
adopted unanimously and the national measure is compatible with the
Treaty. When Member States are barred from enacting legislation
stricter than that of the Community, the tendency is to give all Members
of the Community a broadly similar environmental quality.
When products cross a Member State's borders, the exporting
state's tradeoff between environmental quality and economic performance becomes affected by the importing states' environmental policies. 20 0 This was the challenge that Denmark faced in Commission v.
Denmark. From an economic integration perspective, this interdependency may create an incentive for harmonization in order to remove
2
competitive distortions. 01

The effect of Community harmonized environmental measures will
depend upon whether the Community initiates environmental directives
pursuant to Article 100A or Article 130R. 20 2 The Court's strategy outlined in Commission v. Denmark may be viewed as granting environmen-

tally lax states free access to foreign markets with stricter product
194. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text; see generally Rehbinder, supra
note 170, at 358.
197. See E. REH1BINDER & R. STEWART, supra note 1,at 277.
198. Id. at 11.
199. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
200. E. REHBINDER & R. STEWART, supra note 1,at 9-10.
201. Id. See generally Weatherill, supra note 10, at 690, 692.
202. See generally supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
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controls. 20 3 If this is the case, the environmentally lax States will lose all
incentives to agree to stringent Community measures. 20 4 As a result,
the environmentally lax states may seek to defeat harmonization
attempts taken under Article 130R, which requires unanimity. Under
this view, the net impact of the Court's strategy could be potentially to
reduce the stringency of harmonized measures brought under Article
130R.
It becomes significant that actions taken under Article 100A are
enacted by qualified majority voting. Actions are brought under Article
100A to improve the functioning of the Common Market. 20 5 Thus, such
actions could foster uniform product regulation at a more stringent level
if environmentally tough states carry enough votes to be a qualified
20 6
majority that will override the vetoes of environmentally lax states.
Harmonization clearly provides the most effective means for solving
certain environmental problems. This is especially true for those environmental problems that Member States acting individually could not
adequately address, such as acid rain, ozone transport, fluorocarbons,
carbon dioxide, migratory species, and toxic substances. 20 7 For
instance, because the pollution causing the acid rain may be produced
by one state but affects others, resolution through purely domestic
208
efforts would prove largely ineffective.
Further, where a majority of Member States fails to consider environmental problems in their national strategies, harmonization may be
the only solution. In these instances, harmonization may provide a
"back door" approach for initiating environmental measures that would
not otherwise be adopted by certain Member States. 209 In addition,
action at the Community level also serves to redirect national environmental priorities and regulatory strategies and correspondingly influ210
ence new national policies.
A common argument against harmonization, however, is that Community-issued environmental policies tend to produce less-than-optimal
solutions to environmental problems. Some authors consider Community environmental initiatives to provide the "lowest common denominator" of protection. 2 1 1 They argue that, in the political practice of the
Community, the Commission's proposals for "detailed environmental

203. See E. REHBINDER & R. STEWART, supra note 1,at 11.
204. See generally id. at 11, 277.
205. Supra notes 12, 31, 47 and accompanying text.
206. Cf supra note 47 and accompanying text.
207. See generally Note, The Convention on Long-Range TransboundaryAir Pollution, supra

note 62, at 447-76.
208. Id. at 447.
209. See E. REHBINDER & R. STEWART, supra note 1, at 331-332.
210. Id
211. See Rehbinder, supra note 170, at 358-59; Lomas, supra note 1,at 524-530;
Note, Convention on Long-Range TransboundaryAir Pollution, supra note 62, at 465-467;
E. REHBINDER & R. STEWART, supra note 1, at 213, 250-252, 327-328; Gulmann, The

Single EuropeanAct-Some Remarks From a Danish Perspective, 24 COMM. MKT. L.REv. 31-

40 (1987).
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regulations" often are displaced by lowest common denominator coordination of Member State policies. 2 12 Because Member States must
approve the Commission's proposals, it is fruitless for the Commission
to propose a high level of protection that is incompatible with the realities of Member States' practices. 2 13 This reflects Member States' inabil2 14
ity to agree on more extensive harmonization of their laws.
In general, Member States' positions on Community environmental
proposals tend to reflect economic self-interest. 2 15 A proposal's impact
on the productivity and competitiveness of home industries and jobs significantly influences Member States' positions on the environmental initiatives. 21 6 In objecting to a Community environmental proposal,
Member States with lax standards may be seeking to avoid deterioration
of their competitive positions. 2 17 Thus, the standards eventually
enacted in a directive may reflect the lowest common denominator.
Additionally, the costs and benefits of environmental directives are
spread unevenly among the Member States. Measures aimed at harmonizing and integrating national laws "inevitably require the surrendering
of certain competitive advantages." 2 18 Integrated environmental policy
tends to be uniform, which can mean discrepancies not only in Member
States' preferences for environmental standards but also in their imple2 19
mentation burdens.
As long as the Community retains the institutional framework
whereby national interests prevail in identifying and developing candidates for directives, Community action will undoubtedly reflect Member
States' preferences. 2 20 Community action will continue to reflect Member States' perceptions of the need for common solutions as compared
212. E.

REHBINDER & R. STEWART, supra note 1, at 327-8.
213. Kraemer, supra note 57, at 679.
214. Id.; see also Lomas, supra note 1, at 533. Member States' concerns for their
competitive advantages tend to quell interest in creating environmental policies at
the Community level. Id.
215. For a thorough analysis, see Lomas, supra note 1.
216. Id. at 536. Pressures exerted by major national industrial organizations also
serve to influence the positions adopted by Member States on environmental proposals. Id Additional relevant considerations for Member States include: the environmental damage suffered by the country; national political pressures to address
environmental concerns; population densities; values already existing in the country.
Note, Convention on Long-Range TransboundayAir Pollution, supra note 62, at 463.
217. "Community initiatives on environmental matters are often taken under pressure from Member States who, because of domestic problems and internal political
pressures, have already begun to act on a national level, thus imposing additional
financial burdens on their industries and economies." Lomas, supra note 1, at 536
(emphasis in original). Such cases tempt Member States with suffering industries and
lax environmental standards to exploit their competitive advantage by resisting Community environmental initiatives. Id.
218. Lomas, supra note 1, at 513.
219. Uniform environmental standards can mean insufficient environmental quality in environmentally strict states and excessive quality in environmentally lax states.
For a discussion of incentives and disincentives to integration of environmental laws,
see E. REBINDER & R. STEWART, supra note 1, at 5-7.
220. Id. at 327.
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to national ones. Thus, in order to promote environmental protection,
it is necessary to give Member States freedom to enact stringent environmental measures.
Conclusion
Commission v. Denmark stands as a landmark decision for environmentally
minded States. For the first time, the Court gave Member States the
freedom to enact environmental protection measures contrary to Article
30 in areas the Community has not yet addressed. The Court imposed
limitations consistent with those developed in "Cassis de Dijon" and its
progeny. Until the Community legislates, the Court's approach toward
strict national environmental laws seems secured by precedent.
Commission v. Denmark does not address how the Court will approach
a Member State's environmental law that is more stringent than a Community measure. In this situation, the Court will need to interpret the
new environmental title included in the Single European Act. This title
allows for Member States to "opt out" of Community legislation providing that the national measure is compatible with the Treaty. In determining whether a Member State may "opt out," the Court may rely on
the rule of Commission v. Denmark.
Toni R.F. Sexton

